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AbsTrACT
background Many low and middle income countries 
(LMIC) are implementing payment for performance (P4P) 
schemes to strengthen health systems and make progress 
towards universal health coverage. A number of systematic 
reviews have considered P4P effectiveness but did not 
explore how P4P works in different settings to improve 
outcomes or shed light on pathways or mechanisms of 
programme effect. This research will undertake a realist 
review to investigate how, why and in what circumstances 
P4P leads to intended and unintended outcomes in LMIC.
Methods Our search was guided by an initial programme 
theory of mechanisms and involved a systematic search 
of Medline, Embase, Popline, Business Source Premier, 
Emerald Insight and EconLit databases for studies on 
P4P and health in LMIC. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
identify literature that is relevant to the initial programme 
theory and the research questions underpinning the 
review. Retained evidence will be used to test, revise 
or refine the programme theory and identify knowledge 
gaps. The evidence will be interrogated by examining the 
relationship between context, mechanisms and intended 
and unintended outcomes to establish what works for who, 
in which contexts and why.
Discussion By synthesising current knowledge on 
how P4P affects health systems to produce outcomes 
in different contexts and to what extent the programme 
design affects this, we will inform more effective P4P 
programmes to strengthen health systems and achieve 
sustainable service delivery and health impacts.
bACkgrounD
There has been growing international 
commitment in recent years to the goal of 
achieving universal health coverage (UHC) 
or access to affordable and effective care. 
UHC relies on strong health systems1 and 
on the effective and equitable allocation and 
use of available resources. However, health 
systems in many settings struggle to deliver 
quality care due, for example, to inadequate 
infrastructure; lack of motivated staff; a lack 
of drugs and medical supplies and limited 
adherence to clinical care guidelines.2 
Payment for performance (P4P) has been 
proposed as a strategy to strengthen health 
systems, to improve service delivery and popu-
lation health. P4P consists of financial incen-
tives to healthcare providers and/or their 
managers based on service delivery perfor-
mance3 4 and assumes individuals exert more 
effort in response to incentives, which will 
result in improved quality of care. P4P has been 
widely applied in the USA and the UK.5–7 In 
these countries, payers most often introduce 
P4P by targeting the organisational level rather 
Summary box
 ► Previous reviews of payment for performance (P4P) 
have focused on programme effectiveness, find-
ing mixed effects on incentivised outcomes. These 
reviews did not systematically examine how P4P 
works in different contexts and its potential unin-
tended effects.
 ► This article presents the protocol for a realist re-
view to shed light on for who, how and in what cir-
cumstances P4P works in low and middle income 
countries (LMIC). This review will increase our un-
derstanding of how P4P affects health systems and 
how health systems can be strengthened to deliver 
better care and key attributes of successful P4P pro-
grammes in different contexts.
 ► The outcome of the review will be a refined middle 
range programme theory reflecting actor response 
to P4P (mechanisms) and contextual factors shaping 
this, that can be generalised across LMIC settings.
 ► The review will inform the design of more effective 
P4P programmes to strengthen health systems for 
specific contexts and minimise unintended negative 
effects.  on
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than the individual provider level, with a view to improving 
quality of care. Literature from these settings suggests that 
while P4P may improve processes of care, very few studies 
have demonstrated improvements in health outcomes.8 
Calls for a better understanding of P4P mechanisms have 
also been voiced 9 10 and some authors are now suggesting a 
reconsideration of the role of P4P as a means of improving 
outcomes in healthcare.11 Over 30 low and middle income 
countries (LMIC) are currently implementing P4P schemes 
in the health sector with financial support from inter-
national donors.12 In LMIC, P4P can involve additional 
resources to improve service delivery, investments in infor-
mation systems, more frequent supervision of healthcare 
providers and greater financial decentralisation.13 Hence, 
in these settings, P4P represents a complex package of inter-
ventions, aimed at strengthening health systems to deliver 
better care.14 The focus of incentives in these settings is on 
the quantity of services delivered and quality of care.
Most early evaluations of P4P schemes in LMIC consid-
ered programme effectiveness in terms of improving 
patient and population health outcomes. A systematic 
review of the effect of P4P programmes in LMIC published 
in 2012 reported that the evidence base was too limited 
to draw overall conclusions and that more attention was 
needed to understand how incentive design impacts on 
programme effectiveness.3 This review is currently being 
updated. A more recent review of the effect of P4P on 
quality found evidence of improved process quality for 
antenatal care, but limited or mixed evidence for other 
quality indicators.15 A third review examined the effects of 
P4P on HIV indicators, identifying only four studies with 
positive effects on coverage of HIV testing for couples and 
pregnant women and coverage of antiretrovirals in preg-
nant women, infants and adults.16
In more recent years, researchers have recognised the 
importance of also understanding change mechanisms17 
and documenting the effects of P4P on the health system. 
As a result, there is growing evidence of the effects of 
P4P on health workers,18 18–24 accountability mechanisms 
including supervision systems and community engage-
ment in service delivery,25 26 information systems and 
use of data,27 drug availability,28 patient satisfaction and 
provider-patient interactions.5 None of this evidence 
is captured within the systematic reviews referenced 
above. A more recent review did summarise much of this 
evidence;13 however, the review was focused on extracting 
policy recommendations, but did not explore how P4P 
works in different settings to bring about improvements 
in outcomes or shed light on the pathways or mecha-
nisms of programme effect.
In light of emerging evidence of the health system 
effects of P4P, a further review of the literature is needed 
to investigate how, why and in what circumstances P4P 
leads to intended and unintended outcomes in LMIC 
and how the design of P4P incentives affects the way P4P 
programmes work and their outcomes. Such a review will 
increase our understanding of how P4P affects health 
systems and how health systems can be strengthened to 
deliver better care and key attributes of successful P4P 
programmes in different contexts.
The choice of synthesis methodology should be driven 
by the research question29–32 and we contend that a 
realist approach is best suited for such a review. A system-
atic review is a robust methodology for assessing whether 
interventions are effective, but is not suited to unpacking 
or explaining effects or to answering ‘how and why’ ques-
tions.33 34 Indeed, the existing systematic reviews on P4P 
only included experimental or quasi-experimental studies 
addressing the question of how effective the programme 
was and did not document process changes or contex-
tual factors which allowed the interventions to produce 
outcomes. In contrast to systematic reviews, realist reviews 
are able to include and synthesise a much broader set of 
evidence, including qualitative methods which address 
‘how and why’ questions. A realist approach assumes that 
complex interventions do not operate in a silo; rather 
they operate within social systems and it is ‘the mecha-
nism’ (the response and behaviour of agents interacting 
within the social system) that determines outcomes within 
a given context.34 35 The context can be social, cultural, 
historical or institutional and is what facilitates or limits 
the action of agents.36 The realist approach is guided 
by an initial programme theory of how the programme 
is expected to lead to given outcomes, why and in what 
context (referred to as a context-mechanism-outcome 
configuration—CMO). The realist approach tries to then 
empirically test the hypothesised ‘mechanisms’ or the 
way actors are expected to respond to P4P programmes 
and the changes their response brings about that leads 
to intended and unintended outcomes and to assess 
how this mechanism varies according to the context of 
programme implementation. The review findings are 
then used to determine which CMO configuration(s) 
offer the most robust and plausible explanation of 
observed outcomes. This resulting CMO configuration 
is then compared with the initial programme theory, 
which is modified in light of these findings, resulting in 
a ‘middle range’ programme theory (or a robust under-
standing of the sets of mechanisms and how they unfold 
in different contexts), which can be generalised across 
LMIC.37 In this way, the realist approach aims to discern 
what works for whom, in what context and how and 
why it works to produce both intended and unintended 
outcomes.37
MeTHoDs
Aim and objectives
The overall aim of this review is to help researchers 
and policy makers understand how and why P4P 
programmes implemented in low  and middle income 
countries result in intended or unintended outcomes, 
how the context within which they are implemented 
affects this and which incentive designs are most effec-
tive. In so doing, the review will produce a refined 
middle range programme theory for P4P reflecting the 
way the programme works to deliver specific outcomes 
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in different contexts that can be generalised across 
LMIC. The review aims to address the following specific 
questions:
1. How do actors respond to P4P programmes and what 
changes does their response bring about that leads 
to intended and unintended outcomes (what is the 
‘mechanism’ through which the programme affects 
outcomes)?
2. What contextual and programme design factors deter-
mine whether the identified ‘mechanisms’ produce 
these outcomes?
study design
We will carry out a realist review as proposed by 
Pawson and colleagues.37 The study will be conducted 
in six steps, namely: (1) developing initial programme 
theory; (2) searching for evidence; (3) selecting and 
appraising documents; (4) extracting data; (5) synthe-
sising evidence; (6) presenting and disseminating 
middle range programme theory, as outlined in table 1 
and detailed below. At the time of writing, some of the 
first steps had already been initiated or completed. As a 
result, we use the past tense to describe steps that have 
been completed and the future tense to describe steps 
that have yet to start.
Step 1—Developing an initial programme theory
This step aims to develop an initial programme theory for 
P4P: (1) highlighting the anticipated response of actors 
to the P4P programme and how this response translates 
into (intended and unintended) changes in outcomes 
and (2) identifying the contextual factors ((institutional, 
organisational, socioeconomic, cultural) influencing the 
actor response to the programme (the ‘mechanism’). 
This step also aims to present this theory visually within 
a diagram. To develop an initial programme theory for 
P4P, we drew on five sources of information: (1) moti-
vation theories and theories of demand; (2) existing 
published theories of change related to P4P that were 
known to the authors; (3) theories of change developed 
during stakeholder workshops convened by the research 
team; (4) the research team’s (JB, GB, LA) own research 
knowledge and experience related to P4P; (5) existing 
reviews of P4P.
Existing bodies of theory were used to support the 
general development of the initial programme theory 
in relation to provider response to incentives (motiva-
tion theories of how workers respond to incentives38–40) 
and patient response to changes in service provision 
(the Grossman theory of demand41). To tailor the 
initial programme theory more specifically to P4P, two 
published theories of change were then identified and 
appraised: that presented in the World Bank’s P4P 
impact evaluation toolkit12 and a theory of change used 
within an evaluation study of P4P in Tanzania, in which 
two of the researchers were involved (JB, LA).42 Two 
theories of change diagrams were also reviewed that 
resulted from stakeholder workshops: the first devel-
oped by researchers studying P4P in LMIC, who attended 
a Resilient and Responsive Health Systems research 
consortium workshop in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 
November 2015 (including JB and LA) and the second 
developed by Mexican and UK researchers (including JB 
and LA) studying financial incentives in health, during a 
Newton funded Researcher Links UK-Mexico workshop 
in April 2015. To derive our initial programme theory 
for this review and construct an associated diagram, two 
members of the review team (JB and NSS) appraised 
each diagram, giving priority to common pathways and 
considered these in relation to existing knowledge within 
the team and evidence from published reviews.
The resulting diagram, figure 1, provides a visual repre-
sentation of our initial programme theory. In summary, 
the direct effect of individual financial incentives is to 
make health workers more motivated to adhere to the 
incentivised dimensions of the service (obtain training 
to provide this care, increasing knowledge) and to adopt 
strategies to attract patients to facilities for incentivised 
services (for quantity targets) to maximise incentive 
payments.43–45 Actions taken to comply with incentivised 
indicators may include increased adherence to the clin-
ical care guidelines, making services more affordable 
(reducing informal charges, boosting insurance enrol-
ment46), making services more available (longer opening 
Table 1 Methodological steps to complete the realist 
review (adapted from Molnar et al60)
Steps Task(s)
1 Clarifying the initial 
programme theory
Search for initial theories and 
then consult with experts
2 Search strategy Search electronic databases 
using keywords and Medical 
Subject Heading (MeSH) terms
3 Select and 
appraise 
documents
 ► Use inclusion and exclusion 
criteria to screen for relevant 
abstracts, articles and 
reports
 ► Retrieve full-text of articles 
and reports
4 Extract data  ► Use standardised tool to 
extract relevant data
 ► Search reference lists 
by hand for additional 
potentially relevant articles 
and reports
5 Analysis and 
synthesis process
 ► Analyse data for content 
and outcome patterns and 
synthesise mechanisms
 ► NB: Realist reviews follow 
an iterative search process, 
so revise Step 2 (ie, search 
strategy) if relevant
6 Present and 
disseminate 
revised programme 
theory
Present and refine revised 
theoretical findings with 
relevant stakeholders and 
experts
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hours; increased outreach care47) and becoming more 
responsive to patient needs (improved client-provider 
interactions15 46), resulting in greater patient satisfac-
tion, greater community engagement in service delivery 
through facility governing committees48). Other compo-
nents of P4P programmes are also expected to result in 
change.49 The need for managers to verify performance 
data may increase interactions between providers and 
managers, and when the latter are incentivised, strengthen 
relations between levels of the system, including refer-
rals, and result in more frequent and focused supportive 
supervision.26 Greater commitment of managers to 
service delivery may increase the use of data for decision 
making and the prioritisation of resources to maximise 
performance on incentivised indicators (eg, through 
increased staffing levels and improved staff composition50 
and facilitating provider access to drugs and supplies). 
Part of the incentive is provided to the facility for invest-
ment in drugs, medical supplies or equipment, the avail-
ability of which would conceivably increase in response 
to the programme28 and in turn would enhance worker 
motivation and ability to deliver better and more afford-
able care (by reducing user charges), increasing patient 
satisfaction and service utilisation. However, P4P can also 
result in unintended consequences such as misreporting 
performance (gaming),51 52 the use of coercive strat-
egies to boost demand,47 a reluctance to refer or treat 
patients that could negatively affect their performance 
score, a displacement of effort away from un-incentivised 
services53 and positive spillover effects.46
As contextual factors were not identified within the 
theory of change diagrams we reviewed and appraised, 
these were not included in our diagram. However, we 
identify a number of potentially relevant contextual 
factors within our initial programme theory, notably: 
other policies especially those operating on the demand 
side might impact on P4P effectiveness; the level of health 
system performance and capacity at the time of introduc-
tion of P4P and access to other funding streams54; the 
organisational culture within which P4P is introduced, 
management competencies; the wider context of health 
worker pay54 and the population culture and attitudes 
towards formal medical care.55 We will also explore 
whether effects differ in fragile or postconflict settings, 
compared with other settings,3 and according to how 
P4P was introduced (embedded in existing government 
purchasing systems or as a stand alone programme). We 
will look for details of context within the reviewed papers 
(in relation to characteristics of populations covered by 
P4P; providers implementing P4P and the broader (insti-
tutional, economic, geographic, cultural) context within 
which it is implemented.
We will look for evidence of how contextual factors 
affect implementation and programme mechanisms 
and through comparison across studies, we will examine 
whether mechanisms and outcomes are associated with 
any dimensions of the context within which they are 
implemented. Some aspect of programme design have 
also been identified as potentially relevant to under-
standing mechanisms and outcomes (specifically the 
Figure 1 Initial programme theory mapping the mechanisms through which P4P affects the health system and results in 
outcomes.
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level of incentive relative to other funding, and who and 
what is and is not incentivised).3 55
The initial programme theory was presented to a policy 
and academic audience at the Fourth Global Forum 
for Human Resources in Health in November 2017 for 
external validation. The programme theory and diagram 
will be revisited throughout the evidence review process 
and revised to reflect emerging findings.
Step 2—Searching for evidence
In a second step, we conducted a systematic search for 
primary studies that are relevant to the programme 
theory set out in Step 1, with the aim of identifying 
evidence to test and refine the programme theory. We 
searched Medline, Embase, Popline, Business Source 
Premier, Emerlad Insight and EconLit databases. A 
search strategy was developed and carried out in collab-
oration with an experienced university librarian. The 
search included appropriate indexing terms (ie, MeSH 
terms and keywords) on P4P; on mechanisms relating to 
programme theory and geographic focus (eg, low and 
middle income countries as defined by the World Bank56). 
The search strategy was first developed in Medline and 
then adapted to the other databases (online supplemen-
tary appendix 1). The results of the initial search were 
reviewed to examine whether any known references 
were excluded. The search strategy was subsequently 
modified to be more inclusive and ensure the retention 
of all known articles of relevance by searching for P4P 
MeSH terms and keywords and restricting to low and 
middle-income countries as defined by the World Bank.56 
The search period covered 1 January 1995, when empir-
ical literature first started to emerge on P4P in LMIC, to 
21 November 2017.
After screening papers identified in the systematic 
search, we will also search for international unpublished 
and grey literature (eg, websites of key stakeholders 
including: World Bank, the World Health Organization, 
Cordaid, Norad, the Department for International Devel-
opment, USAID and PEPFAR) as well as Google Scholar 
and Web of Science to identify academic working papers 
and evaluation reports or policy documents published by 
LMIC governments, international organisations, non-gov-
ernmental organisations and consultancy firms. The 
research team’s contacts with networks of researchers, 
decision-makers and other stakeholders with knowledge 
of P4P in LMIC will also facilitate the identification and 
collection of such documents.
Reference lists of all identified studies and documents 
will be screened to identify potential additional litera-
ture that were not captured within the original review. 
The literature review search will end at the point of 
saturation, that is, when the research yields no further 
new sources of information. All search results from elec-
tronic databases and other sources will be imported into 
Endnote reference management software and duplicates 
removed.
Step 3—Selecting and appraising documents
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed to iden-
tify literature that is relevant to the initial programme 
theory (figure 1) and the research questions underpin-
ning the review57—see table 2. Retained evidence will be 
used to test, revise or refine elements within the initial 
programme theory. The review will also identify knowl-
edge gaps where evidence is limited in relation to the 
initial programme theory. Where there is conflicting 
evidence on a given component, we will explore contex-
tual and scheme design differences that may account for 
variation in findings. Studies with any evaluation design 
were allowed as per realist review guidelines. The rele-
vance of the retrieved articles/publications was assessed 
according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined 
below. Next, two reviewers (NSS and JB) independently 
screened all titles and abstracts for suitability for inclu-
sion. Disagreements were noted and discussed to reach 
agreement based on consistent criteria.
Step 4—Extracting data
Data will be extracted into a Microsoft Excel spread-
sheet . The spreadsheet captures information on general 
study characteristics such as the author name, year, 
study setting, P4P implementing organisation, and study 
type.  In addition, data will be extracted according to a 
set of domains identified by NSS and JB based on the 
content of the initial programme theory,documenting 
mechanisms (the programme effects on different health 
system elements and the links between these effects), 
context (who is this working for or not working for; 
why is this working or not working; in what contexts is 
it working/not working), outcomes (the final outcomes 
of the programme) and programme design elements 
(level of incentive, what is incentivised, who gets the 
incentive). To test the suitability of these domains they 
will be pretested on two purposefully selected articles by 
NSS and JB. The domains will be revised iteratively as 
the review progresses and new mechanisms and effects 
emerge from the evidence that were not within the orig-
inal programme theory and as more focused and specific 
research questions arise.
 We will also appraise the quality of methodology and 
describe the methodology using The Mixed-Method 
Appraisal Tool, which is suited to the assessment of quan-
titative, qualitative and mixed-methods approaches.58
The review will compare and contrast evidence, 
looking for consistent CMO configurations emerging 
from the evidence to support, refine or modify the initial 
programme theory.
Step 5—Analysis and synthesis of data
Each study will be read by two authors (JB and NSS) and 
discussed to assess whether emerging findings support, 
refute or reinterpret the preliminary programme theory 
(figure 1). To this end, evidence will be interrogated 
by examining the relationship between context, mech-
anisms and outcomes, both intended and unintended, 
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to establish what works for who, in which contexts and 
why. The analysis and synthesis will involve looking for 
recurrent relationships between context, mechanisms 
and outcomes in the documents. We will examine how 
similar mechanisms act in different contexts to generate 
outcomes. The findings emerging from the review will 
be questioned and contradictory examples sought in 
the data. An appraisal of the strengths/weaknesses of 
the research methods used by papers to be integrated 
into the synthesis will be undertaken. The findings will 
be used to refine, adjust or modify theory, resulting in 
a middle-range theory37 of the links between contextual 
factors, mechanisms and outcomes of P4P interventions.
Step 6—Generating a revised programme theory
The revised programme theory will be described in text 
and using a diagram and the review will be reported 
according to the standards outlined by the realist and 
meta-narrative evidence synthesis (RAMESES) group.59 
Pawson et al37 argue that stakeholders should be involved 
in confirming emerging findings and in dissemination 
activities. Emerging findings and CMO configurations 
will be presented and debated during a conference 
session on P4P theories of change in 2018. The final 
programme theory will be that emerging from these 
stakeholder discussions.
DisCussion
This study involves a realist approach to synthesising 
evidence to generate an improved understanding of how 
and why P4P programmes result in intended or unin-
tended outcomes, within which contexts and which incen-
tive designs are most effective. In so doing, the review will 
ultimately produce a refined middle range programme 
theory for P4P reflecting actor response to P4P (mecha-
nisms) and contextual factors shaping these, that can be 
generalised across LMIC. The use of a realist approach 
will allow the review to describe and explain how and why 
P4P initiatives work (or fail to work) in different contexts 
by exploring the underlying programme theories and the 
interactions between contextual factors, mechanisms of 
change and outcomes.
Synthesising current knowledge of how P4P affects 
health systems to produce outcomes in different contexts 
and to what extent the incentive design affects this will 
inform more effective P4P programmes to strengthen 
health systems and achieve sustainable service delivery 
Table 2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
The exposure (intervention) is a P4P intervention. These 
schemes had to target healthcare providers and/or managers 
(supply-side), incentives had to be financial and cash 
disbursement had to be varied accordingly to performance, 
defined as the achievement of quantitative indicators for 
selected healthcare services, quality-related indicators or 
both quantity-related and quality-related indicators. When 
performance is linked to quantitative outputs, it has to be 
related to ‘selected healthcare services’ as such criterion 
allows one to discriminate between P4P and fee for service 
mechanisms.
Schemes targeting beneficiaries of health services (ie, 
demand-side incentives); Supply-side P4P schemes outside 
of the health sector; P4P schemes that did not specifically 
target selective health services and, therefore, were not 
distinguishable from fee for service schemes
The study should isolate (or attempt to isolate) the effects of 
P4P programmes from that of broader policy reforms, which 
often encompass the P4P reform.
Studies which do not attempt to isolate the effects of P4P 
from broader reforms.
The evaluation of pilot projects will be included in the study. Studies of the ‘potential’ implementation of P4P strategies not 
yet in place.
The study outcome has to be either a quantitative or 
qualitative measure (or both) of the impact of the P4P initiative 
on one or more health system functions described in the initial 
programme theory (figure 1) or other relevant mechanisms or 
contextual factors affecting outcomes.
Studies that only examine impact on ultimate service 
utilisation and health outcomes and do not examine 
mechanisms and/or context.
The study should report on primary data sources. Where the 
study refers to different sources of evidence for primary data 
(eg, in the case of systematic reviews), the primary source of 
information will be retrieved and explored.
Studies that do not report primary data sources (eg, 
commentaries or reviews), though these will be screened for 
relevant additional references.
The intervention had to be implemented in an LMIC, as 
defined by the World Bank.56
Studies in high-income settings.
Studies in English, French, Portuguese or Spanish. Studies in languages other than English, French, Portuguese 
or Spanish
FFS, fee-for-service; LMIC, low  and middle  income countries; P4P, payment for performance.
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and health impact and minimise unintended effects. 
This review will also shed light on how context shapes 
the design of performance-based financing programmes 
and their subsequent implementation, which will be 
useful in determining where P4P can be most effectively 
implemented.
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